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Abstract
It is generally taken for granted that "independence" is a good thing for the press, that an independent
press is necessary for democratic government, and that we know what we mean when we say a
newspaper or television or radio station is "independent."
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Universal Declaration o( Human Rights, Art. 19
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A Tyranny of Images
MONROE E. PRICE

I

T IS GENERALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED that
"independence" is a good thing for the press, that an independent
press is necessary for democratic government, and that we know
what we mean when we say a newspaper or television or radio station
is "independent."
In the American view, independence for the press largely means
immunity from government interference. But throughout the former
Soviet Union, independence has come to mean not only independence from government, or independence from ancient theologies of
reportage, or independence, even, from the influences of the West. In
the emerging battle for identities in Ukraine or Kazakhstan, Estonia
or Azerbaijan, independence has often meant, above all, freedom
from televised images produced by Russia.
In a shakily independent Ukraine or Kazakhstan or Estonia in
1992 and after, a major question was autonomy from the imperial center, from the cultural forces that held sway for 70, if not for hundreds,
of years. The monumental television transmitter in Moscow was symbolic of the process. A steel pylon with a huge concrete base, massive
in proportion like the Egyptian pyramids, it represented the power to
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send a signal throughout the vast domain not only of Russia but,
metaphorically, through the entire territories of the former Soviet
Union. It epitomized the power of the desire to assert a monopoly
over public thought. The transmitter became an encumbering remembrance of the past and an indication, through the signals it transmitted, of the complexities of defining the independence of the future.
In Kiev, for example, Russian, not Ukrainian, had predominated as the language of both the state and the media. Surprised at its
independence, Ukraine had to determine what attention should be
given to the cultural element of its identity. This was not only a question of changing street names, or of finding new purposes for the
palatial but empty Lenin Museum. The very imagery of nationhood
was to be forged.
Nevertheless, for an average household in the Ukraine, on an
average evening in the early days of independence, the television set
was turned to Moscow, to the glitz and professionalism of Ostankino, the First Channel, as opposed to the more amateurish, more
unpracticed presenters at home. Moscow was the home of a postSoviet teenage music culture, producing short videos with quick
cuts, computer graphics and the look of the West. Lights flashed on
and off, electronic effects cast their technological spell. Ukrainian
folk songs and country dances could not compete. And the tendency
of the young Parliament to demand time for its deliberations compounded the problem of fashioning a Ukrainian alternative to the
Moscow diet.
In the remembered days of the USSR, Gostelradio had been the
supreme voice of the state and the party. There had been no competition, and the stolid presentation had been a tribute to political and
cultural monopoly. Television in the republics had been organized
with some minor modicum of separateness, but the organization in
Kiev had been subordinate to the administration in Moscow. The
executives and the news presenters had all understood what it meant
to be in a command society and what risks not to take. They had
been charged, as well, with using the medium not to underscore divisive differences but to reinforce solidarity and the cultural and political superiority of the center-Moscow.
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It was not only in the living rooms of Ukraine that one could
see the consequences of these practices of cultural domination. In the
offices of Ukrtelradio-the Ukrainian state radio and television
monopoly-there was a virtual acknowledgment, in 1992, of the continued drawing power of Moscow television. The officials there had
to compete with television from Moscow that had become miraculously younger and Westernized in the Gorbachev period. Programs
had more razzle-dazzle; rock videos appeared together with culture
and news. Anchors had brand name recognition. There were glamorous hosts and hostesses, fashionable and daring clothes and beguiling, softly erotic shots of 15-year-old rock stars. Moscow, in its new
regional incarnation, had chosen to deal with the problem of which
culture to carry by going global.
OSCOW'S TRANSFORMATIONS were important; they reverberated all over the old empire. At the beginning of 1992, with the decline of the Soviet Union, the First Channel,
formerly the flagship for Gorbachev and for each leader before him,
was in danger of abandonment. The enterprise, a centerpiece of the
Soviet Union, now needed a client. Russia itself was the major candidate, but there was an intriguing alternative: an all-commonwealth
channel, one dedicated to maintaining an informal sense of the
region, with a voice that acknowledged the new sovereignties but
remembered the old ties. Such a role might have been all the more
important if the budget of the First Channel were to be dependent
on specific allocations from each of the republics. And indeed, a
Council of Presidents of all the republics initially considered such an
arrangement.
But this view placed the newly sovereign nations, like Ukraine,
in an unusual position. In the first year of their independence,
Ukrainian officials were sensitive to every slight. Tested on all fronts
as to their distinctiveness (from military to language policy), trying to
appear separate and distinct, they believed that Moscow television
was inflammatory, insulting and particularly biased on Ukraine-Russia relations. Daily news and interview shows were scanned for a proRussian, anti-Ukrainian perspective.
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For the media czars in Kiev it was a matter of concern, if not
embarrassment, that although they had obtained political severance
from Russia, Russian television dominance still continued. Indeed, the
ministers of the new Ukraine considered alternatives: pressing for the
closure of the Moscow First Channel and the dividing of its assets,
jamming its signal or imposing a governing structure-through the
Council of Presidents-that would make the channel less biased, at
least from the Ukrainian or non-Russian perspective.
Instead, there was a temporary but complex compromise.
Ukraine and the other republics would no longer finance program
production on the First Channel; Russia would pay the bill. On the
other hand, Ukraine would not charge for the transmission of the
signal to its country's inhabitants. The consequence was a curious,
impermanent, and intermediate cultural imperialism-one that recognized historic links between the former Soviet republics and the
substantial continuing Russian population in Ukraine and elsewhere.
The force of this now-external Russian programming was so
ingrained that no government, particularly at a time of economic
deprivation, could risk the consequences of its elimination.
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H EST RUG G LEfor "independence," then, assumed many
forms-human, historical, geographical, financial. The formerly
Moscow-controlled Ukranian state television sought a new future
and a charter to find and promulgate a national identity that would
support the new status quo. Its citadel in Kiev would be a large modern complex built in the last decade of the Soviet empire. Rather than
consider the new edifice an inappropriate symbol for the press in a
post-totalitarian state, the old bureaucrats of Ukraine dedicated this
broadcasting city to a brave new world of statist broadcasting for
Ukraine, where a new officialdom and a new national identity needed buttressing. Maybe architecture would be as good a guide to its
future as the images that scurry across the reformed television screen.
Three years later, the question of imagery and geographical
independence from Moscow was sharpened as the relations between
Ukraine and Russia became momentarily more severe (as would be
true between Russia and many of the former Republics). In spring
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1994 the tense relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
found a spark in disputes over Russian broadcasts thought to encourage a breakaway Crimea, and over the rights of Russian journalists-now called "foreign correspondents"-to accreditation in Kiev
and Kharkov. Leonid Kravchuk, then president of Ukraine, had stated that coverage on Ostankino and in other Russian media was
biased against Ukraine, and that it was weakening support for his
state. Ostankino journalists working in Kharkov and Odessa were
denied accreditation. Was this action retaliation for an ill-received
slight, the start of a "media war" or something else? An adviser to the
Ukrainian embassy in Moscow, Vadim Doganov, contended that the
action was specific to these journalists and was because of their
"nonobjective reporting." He claimed that the government acted in
accordance with the new Ukrainian media law.
"Independent" broadcasting was emerging in Ukraine and elsewhere but it was not necessarily serving the goals which inspired its
advocates. The central broadcasting empire had been weakened. That
was certain. But it was far from evident that the gap had been filled
with indigenous broadcasters independent of the state, using that independence to ferret out truth, to empower ordinary citizens in the
democratic process and to provide access to means of self-expression.
True, a generation of publishers, editors and journalists was training
itself and being courted from abroad. True, the process of adaptation
was proceeding full tilt. But as elsewhere in the world, the hoped-for
commitment to more independent television news and public-service
broadcasting was little in evidence in a society where an appetite for
advertising and a new mood of deregulation were the call of the day.

